Central Bank Structure and monetary policy uncertainty by García de Paso Gómez, José Isidoro
CENTRAL BANK STRUCTURE AND MONETARY 
POLICY UNCERTAlNTY* 
José l. García de Paso 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
ABSTRACT 
Recent research has shown that partisanship causes monetary policy 
uncertainty. Since monetary policy is implemented by central banks, this paper 
models alternative central banks structure to analyze their effects on policy 
uncertainty in a two-party political system. the majar result of the paper is that 
the length of govemors' terms plays a more important role than the number of 
govemors on the board. moreover, it is shown that both postelectoral 
appointments and the membership of administration officials on the central 
bank board raise monetary policy uncertainty. The paper' results are illustrated 
by analyzing alternative structures of the Federal Reserve Board of Govemors. 
RESUMEN 
Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo de la estructura institucional de un banco 
central para analizar los efectos que esa estructura tiene sobre la incertidumbre 
del público respecto a la política monetaria futura. El principal resultado 
obtenido es que la duración del mandato de los gobernadores juega un papel 
de mucha mayor importancia que el número de éstos. Asimismo se muestra 
que la existencia de una estructura postelectoral de nombramientos y el derecho 
de la administración a sentar a alguno de sus miembros en el consejo del banco 
central aumentan la incertidumbre monetaria. Los resultados se ilustran 
mediante el análisis de estructuras alternativas del Consejo de Gobernadores 
de fa. Reserva Federal. 
* This paper is based upon a chapter uf my doctoral the1is {in progwss) at the Universidad Complutense 
de Madrid. Research facilities provided by CEMFI are gratefully acknowledged. 
1..:_ INTRODUCTION 
Partisanship in monetary policy has recently been subject to a great deal 
of attention. At a theoretical level, there are several reasons that could 
explain partisan differences in monetary policy. Hibbs (1986) suggests that 
such differences arise because the constituency bases of diverse political 
parties differ in their relative position in the income distribution as well 
as in their absolute level of economic well-being. As a consequence, these 
constituencies are diversely affected by monetary policy. Since parties 
promote policies broadly consistent wi th the interests and preferences of 
their core constituencies, differences in the interests and preferences of 
party clienteles are reflected on the partisan pattern of monetary policies. 
Havrilesky (1987) suggests that monetary policy is often used to offset 
the incentive adverse effects of distributionally motivated policies. 
Therefore, if parties differ in the amount of redistribution they are engaged 
in, such differences will be reflected on partlsan monetary pollcles. 
At the same time, the existence of heterogeneity of market structures in 
an economy may generate partisanship in monetary policy (Waller, 1992b), 
Moreover, economic di versi ty across regions wi thin a monetary union may 
provoke significant differences in the types of monetary policies advocated by 
different regions (Alesina and Grilli, 1992). 
At an empirical level, recent evidence is consistent with partisanship in 
monetary pollcy, at least for the U.S. case (Havrllesky, 1987; Alesina and 
Sachs, 1988; Chappell and Keech, 1988; García de Paso, 1993a). 
Whi~e creating a central bank independent of the government may be 
feasible, it is unlikely that political influence on it will be completely 
ellminated. Since the central bank is not divorced from the political process 
and modern societies are heterogeneous (in sorne or all the senses cited 
above), the central bank is subject to di verse polltlcal lnfluences because 
its objectives may not be agreed upan. 
In practice, there exist severa! ways through which partisan influences 
can be transmitted to the central bank:. The main channels that researchers 
have explored are direct signalling of desired monetary policies (Havrilesky, 
1988, 1991), coercion and bashing (Wal ler, 1991), and central bank 
appointments (Havrilesky and Schweitzer, 1990¡ Gildea, 1990; Havrilesky and 
Gildea, 1992). From an empirical point of view, in the U.S. case the primary 
mechanism by wich partisan differences in monetary policies arise seems to be 
the appointment process (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993). 
Both the existence of social, econornic, political or geographical groups 
with different preferences in monetary policy and the possibility that such 
groups appoint central bank: governors cause partisanship in monetary policy to 
arise. 
Alesina (1987) and Ball (1992) bave shown, in a frarnework where 
government and central bank coincide, that the presence of partisanship 
contributes to increase the variability in the conduct of monetary policy and 
to generate uncertainty about its future stance, 
Given the facts that societies are heterogeneous and that the appointment 
of central bank governors is a polltical process, it seems natural to ask how 
the design of altérnative central bank structures will affect monetary policy 
uncertainty. Research in this way will lead to further understanding of the 
role of monetary 24nstitutions and how partisanship influences the monetary ~ 
pollcy-rnaking framework. 
In arder to perform this task i t is necessary a level of theoretical 
analysis that, for the mornent, has only been carried out by Waller (1989, 
1992a). 
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In bis first paper, Waller uses a two-party model to show how overlapping 
the terms of central bank governors reduces monetary policy uncertainty. 
However, the central bank structure he models is such that the number of 
governors and the number of periods in governors' terms are the same, Because 
of this particular structure, he mistakenly considers that the number of 
governors plays the key role to characterize monetary policy uncertainty. 
In bis second paper, Waller formulates a model within the context of a 
two-party political system, in which the winning party is allowed to nominate 
' candidates to serve as central bank governors and the losing party has the 
right to confirm the nominees. It is shown that in this institutional 
framework the appointments to the central bank are more rnoderate in their 
views on monetary policy than wi thin a framework in which the losing party 
cannot veto the nominees. However, slnce his model does not specify the voting 
process through which the board of governors determines the monetary pollcy 
actually implemented, it does not allow to characterize the monetary policy 
stance under a particular composi tion of the board. As a consequence, his 
paper cannot provide any conclusion about the way the pattern of appointments 
affects monetary policy uncertainty. 
As a further step towards the development of positive theories of 
monetary institutions, the purpose of. this paper is to construct central bank. 
alternative generic structures in arder to discuss their effects on monetary 
policy uncertainty. At the same time, the paper' results are illustrated by 
analyzing alternative (past, present and potential) structures of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors. 
The key results obtained are the following: 
-the lengthening of governors' terms in office reduces monetary policy 
uncertainty. 
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-the number of governors has no effect on uncertainty. 
-governors' terms running concurrently with the administration's term in 
office raise policy uncertainty. 
-the membership of administration officials on the central bank board either 
raises or leaves unaffected monetary policy uncertalnty. 
The rest of the paper contains five sections. Section 2 presents the 
institutional structure. Section 3 derives a general expression to obtain 
monetary policy uncertainty. Section 4 uses that expression to analyze the 
effects of the nwnber of governors, the length of governors' terms, the 
membership of administration officials on the board, and the timing of 
appointments on monetary uncertainty. Section S applies those results to 
illustrate the likely effects of earlier and current proposals to alter the 
structure of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and section 6 concludes. 
b_ INSTITIJTIONAL STRUCTIIRE 
Consider an independent central bank who conducts monetary policy ruled 
by a r-member board (r is an uneven integer) whose members serve n-period 
overlapping terms (nis a submultiple of r). 
Once a governor is appointed, he cannot be fired or voted out of office 
befare his term expires. Moreove·r, it is assumed that no resignations from the 
board occur. 
The central bank conducts monetary policy through controlling a monetary 
instrwnent -(denote'.:t
1
by m) like a money stock rate of growth, an interest rate 
-¿ 
or another policy íllstrument. 
There are two different political parties in this economy (1,2) 
interacting through an electoral process being held every Perlad. The parties 
have different preferences about the monetary policy instrument (m1, m2 ). 
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These preferences are common knowledge. 
The winning party has the right to fill the vacancies that regularly 
occur on the board. Governors appolnted by each party are assumed to adhere to 
the monetary policy desired by the party who appointed them. The existence of 
two diverse attitudes determines, in turn, the types of monetary policy action 
each governor will advocatel. 
Let P be the probability that party 1 wins the election, with 1-P being 
the probability that party 2 wins. In arder to simplify the solution to the 
model we assume that P is exogenously determined and time-stationar,,Z. 
The monetary policy actually implemented by the central bank board of 
governors is determined by a majority-rule voting process. Given this rule, 
the uneven number of members on the board penol ts us to easi ly characterize 
the monetary policy actually implemented. Such a policy course will be the 
value of the monetary instrwnent preferred by the median voter on the board. 
Therefore, the intensity of preference of each governor does not matter for 
the policy decislon and, thus, a governor. does not have any strategic 
incentive to misrepresent his own pref'.~renc~S · (~·ee appendix 1). 
Each period of time a number of vacancies on the board occurs. These 
vacancies are filled by appointing new governors. In arder to have at least 
one vacancy occurring every period of time and, in turn, to ha.ve a chance of 
finding uncertainty over the future course of rnonetary policy, we have asswned 
that the number of periods in governors' terms is a submultiple of the number 
of members on the board. 
1 That is, we do not consider institutional structures where the losing party 
has the right to reject a nominee if it so desires. Because of this reason, 
the paper of Waller (1992a) complements our analysis for institutional 
structures where confirmation hearings exist. 
2 In an Alesina' s type partisan policy model, García de Paso (1993b) shows 
that the existence of endogenous voting affects the monetary policies 
implemented by each party when in office but does not have any effect on the 
outcome of future elections. 
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At the start of each perlod, the publlc sets expected monetary policy. 
Expectations are assumed to be rational, Then an electlon is held and the 
winning party fil! the board vacancies so that a new central bank structure is 
determined. Next the central bank chooses the monetary policy preferred by its 
median member. 
.J.,_ MONETARY POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
3.1. Derivation of policy uncertainty 
Now we are interested on measuring monetary policy uncertainty arising 
from the institutional structure just laid out. To do this we will make use of 
the conditional variance of the central bank monetary instrument. 
Since r is the number of governors on the board and n is the number of 
periods in governors' terms, the ratio r/n indicates the number of vacancies 
ocurring every period. At the same time, ((n-1)r/n) is the number of governors 
who have not completed their terms (i.e., the incumbent members on the board). 
Given this institutlonal framework, we can observe a number of lncumbency 
structures on the board. That is, we can observe a number of different board 
compositions at the time vacancies occur. 
In spi te of ocurring vacancies every period, there may be incumbency 
structures such that there is no uncertainty about the future stance of 
monetary policy. The reason is that we may find incumbency structures such 
that the number ~f new appointees is smaller than the difference between the 
' 
" number of party ~1 incumbents and the number of party 2 -incumbents. In such 
cases, the future monetary policy is known with certainty, irrespective of the 
party the new appointees belong to. 
The set A includes all the incumbency structures which generate monetary 
policy uncertainty. Let x be the number of party 1 incumbent governors. lben 
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the set A can be expressed as 
(1) 
The set A indicates that the number of party 1 incumbents which provokes 
monetary policy uncertainty is such that the difference of incumbents between 
parties is strictly smaller than the number of new appolntees (r/n). 
Under the assumption that governors appointed by each party adhere to the 
monetary policy desired by the appointing party, all the r/n governors 
appointed at the same perlad of time have identical preferences on monetary 
policy. To account for this fact, it must be noticed that any incumbency 
structure existing each period will consist of severa! blocks of governors 
appointed by former administrations. Therefore, the number of incumbent 
governors from each party should be a mul tiple of the number of governors 
appointed every perlad. 
As a consequence, any incumbency structure will be composed of severa! 
blocks, each consisting of r/n governors. Each block of r/n governors is 
appointed by the same party. Hence, the number of blocks within any incumbency 
structure is given by 
(2) 
n-1 
--r 
n 
r 
n 
n-1 
Let z be the number of blocks wi thin the incumbency structure appointed 
by party 1. Then, we have 
(3) X 
7 
r 
z-
n 
Then the set A of incumbency structures which provide monetary 
uncertainty can be expressed as 
(4) 
(5) 
A { z e W, z • n-1, 
The set A can be rewritten as 
2z!: 
n [
n-1 ] 
- --r 
n 
A= { z e~. z ~ n-1, lzz - (n-1)/ - 1 <O} 
Each incumbency structure causing monetary pollcy uncertainty can be 
obtained in a number of different wayS. The number of times a particular 
incumbency structure can be observed is gi ven by the number of ways of 
choosing the incumbent governors that compase such a structure without regard 
to order and provided that uncertainty arises. 
The only value of z one can find into the set A is 
(6) 
Since (l-z)=(n-1)/2 is the number of party 2 lncumbents which generales 
electoral uncertainty, it is clear that -in arder to observe electoral 
uncertainty- there must be the same number of incumbents from each party. 
That particular incumbency structure may be obtained from the n-1 
previous electoral results. Hence, the number of ways we can observe such a 
, 
structure is giverrJby the binomial coefficient 
"1 
(7) 
[ 
n-1 ] 
n-1 
-2-
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Moreover, there exists a particular probabllity of observing such an 
incumbency structure with uncertainty. This probabillty is given by the 
likelihood of observing an incumbency structure consisting of (n-1 )/2 blocks 
of party governors (the remaining ones belonging to party 2). This 
probability is given by the following expression 
(8) 
Once the probabili ty of observing each incumbency structure wi th 
uncertainty is calculated, next it is necessary -for each of these incumbency 
boards- to obtain the probabili ties of observing a particular (m1 or m2) 
monetary policy as well as the expectation of the upcoming monetary policy. 
Suppose an incumbency structure with uncertalnty where x is the number of 
party 1 incumbents and { ( (n-1 )r/n) - x) is the number of party 2 incumbents. 
Then the probabili ty of observing m1 is given by the likelihood of the event 
that the number of party incumbents plus the number of party new 
appointees generate a majority on the board. Let j be the number of new 
appointees belonging to party 1. Thus the set 8 contains the number of party 1 
new appointees such that -given the number of party 1 incumbents (x)- the 
monetary policy actually implemented is m1 (that is, party 1 has a majority of 
governors on the board). 
(9) B • { j e W, j • r/n, (j+x) > i} 
The number of new appointees belonging to party 1 ñiay be r/n or zero. 
n-1 r Since the only incumbent structure with uncertainty consists of -z-·n party 
n-1 r 
incumbents and -z-·n party 2 incumbents, the set B that contains the number of 
party 1 new appointees such that the rnonetary policy actually implemented is 
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m1 can be expressed as: 
(10) 
( 11) 
B.= {je {r/n, o}. [j + n;l·~J > ~} = {rin} 
f t 1 appointees. Then, we have Let t be the num.ber of new blocks o par Y 
j = 
Thus, the set B can be expressed as 
.r ,_
n 
For this particular i, the number of feasible pat terns of new 
that the new appointees provoke a party 1 majori ty on the appointments such 
board is just one, as shown by the binomial coefficient 
[13) 
[ 1 l 
Since the probability of party 1 winning the election and therefore of 
· p then the probability of a monetary appointing r/n party 1 governors is , 
'mplemented when there exists a split incumbency stru~ture is policy m1 being .. 
P. Accordingly, the probability of observing m2 is 1-P. 
Hence, the ,conditional mathematical expectation of the monetary policy 
instrument is 1f 
[14) 
so that the differences between actual and expected monetary policy will be: 
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1 j 
[15) 
The probabili ty of observing these differences are P and 1-P, 
respectively. 
Hence, the conditional varlance of the monetary ins~rument when governors 
are appointed just after the election by the new administration is given by 
(17) Var{m) 1 
AE 
The expression 
{18) 
so that monetary uncertainty is 
[19) Var{m) 1 
AE 
!.,_ THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING CEN1RAL BANKS' STRUCTIJRES 
Since our model charac-terizes monetary policy uncertainty depending on 
the central bank structure, it will enable us to analyze the effects of the 
number of governors and of the length of governors' terms_ on monetary policy 
uncertainty. Moreover, we will see the effects of changing the appointment 
patterns of governors so that their terms run concurrently with the 
administration's term in office. If terms are coincident, at the time the new 
administration takes office, it appoints the new governors. On the contrary, 
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if terms are not coincident, the admlnistratlon appolnts the governors just 
before the election is held. In the former case, there exists electoral 
uncertainty with respect to the new governors' monetary preferences. In the 
latter case, however, the expectations on the future course of monetary policy 
are formed by knowing in advance the composition of the central bank board. In 
addition, our analysis will permit us to evaluate the effects on monetary 
uncertainty of the membership of administration officials on the central bank 
board. 
4.1. The length of governors' terms 
Expression (19) indicates that the lengthening of governors' terms in 
office reduces monetary policy uncertainty. As the number of periods in a term 
approaches infinity, the variance of the monetary policy instrument goes to 
zero. 
The reason is that, the greater the number of periods in governors' 
terms, the greater the number of incumbent blocks and the less likely that the 
new block of appointees will be pivotal. 
4.2. The number of governors on the board 
At the same time it can be seen that expression (19) does not depend on 
the number of governors on the board. That is, if we modify the number of 
governors on the board, monetary policy uncertainty will remain unaffected. 
SUch a conclusion ,pan also be obtained from expression {S) which shows that 
;, 
there exists a •Jirficient' parameter (the length of governors' terms) in 
arder to characterize monetary policy uncertainty. 
Waller (1989) investigates the results obtained under a central bank 
structure ruled by a three-member board whose members serve three-period 
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overlapplng terms. By extrapolatlng hls results to a n-member, n-perlod 
setting, he obtains an expression for the variance of the monetary policy 
instrument similar to ours although our derivation is more general {since our 
model is not constra-ined to r=n). Nevertheless, his expression and ours are 
similar because, as was shown above, the number of governors on the board does 
not have any influence on monetary policy uncertainty. 
Because of the particular central bank structure he models, Waller cannot 
distinguish between number of governors and length of a term on the central 
bank board. As a consequence, he mistakenly considers that the 'sufficient' 
parameter in arder to characterize monetary policy uncertainty is the number 
of governors. Thus, Waller argues that monetary policy uncertainty can be 
driven very clase to zero by a marked increase in the number of board members. 
4.3. The membership of administration officials on the central bank board 
This subsection analyzes a particular case where there are members on the 
central bank board differing in the length of their terms in office. An 
example of this type of circumstances arises for institutional structures 
under which the administration -in addition to the right to fill the regular 
vacancies that occur on the board- has the right to appoint to the central 
bank one or several of its officials to serve one period of time {i.e., the 
time horizon between two elections). 
Such a board structure corresponds, for instance, to the pre-1935 Board 
of Governor-s of the Federal Reserve System where the Secretary of the Treasury 
participated in monetary policy deliberations. Along this line, recently a 
number of legislati ve proposals have sought to increase the influence of the 
President over monetary policy by adding AdministratlOn officials {the 
Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors) to 
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the Federal Open Market Commitee (Ak:htar and Howe, 1991). 
Let consider an institutional structure such that a new administration 
places one or severa! officials on the central bank board when i t takes 
office. The length of these officialS' t~rms on the central bank is one 
period. 
Imagine an initial situation where the central bank is ruled by r 
governors serving n overlapping periods of time. Next consider an 1 
lnstitutional proposal which incorporales s administration officlals to the 
central bank (where s is an even lnteger). 
As a result, the new number of board seats is r+s, the number of seats 
becoming vacant each period is s + rln, and the incumbency structure consists 
of (n-l)r/n members. The set C including all the incumbency structures which 
generate monetary policy uncertainty is such that the difference of incumbent 
governors between parties is strictly smaller than the number of new filled 
seats (s + rln). 
(20) e 
Rewriting expression (20), one obtains 
(21) 
e J z e "· z > n-1, J2z - (n-1) J - [1 + r~nJ < O } 
ey 
Expression C2:i) shows that, in the new framework, the uncertainty about 
future monetary policy is not only determined by the length of governors' 
terms (n), but also by both the number of governors {r) and the number of 
administration officlals on the board (s). It is worth noticing that the 
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decomposition of the number of seats on the board (r+s) lnto r and s matters 
to characterize monetary uncertainty. 
Slnce the set C may contain values of z in addition to (n-1)/2, the 
number of times we can observe incumbency structures provoking monetary 
uncertainty are given by the binomial coefficient 
(22) 
There exlsts a particular probability of observing each incumbency 
structure with uncertainty. This probability is given by the likelihood of 
seeing an incumbency structure consisting of z incumbent blocks of party 1 
governors and n-1-z incumbent blocks of party 2 governors. Its expression is 
the following: 
(23) 
For each incumbency structure with uncertalnty, we can observe m1 with 
probability P and m2 with probability 1-P. 
Since -within the set C- i t may be possible to find severa! values of z 
which generate the monetary policy m1 , the conditlonal variance of the 
monetary policy instrument if s administration officials seat on the central 
bank board will be: 
(24) 
(25) 
Var(m) 1 
M 
Rearranging, we obtain 
Var(rn) J 
M 
n-1 
z 
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where C was already defined in (21). 
(26) 
(27a) 
(27b) 
(28a) 
(28b) 
Let C' be the following set of party 1 blocks of incumbent governors: 
C' { z e~. z < n-1, z • (n-lÍ/2, ¡2z - (n-1)1 - [1 + r~nJ <O} 
From expression (26) it is easy to see that the following holds: 
C' ""121 
C' • 
if 
if 
_!_ > 1 
rln 
s 
r/n < 1 
Now, let W be the following expression: 
w 
[ 
n-1 
ÍzeC' z 
o if e· • 
if C' °"' ¡z¡ 
Then we can write 
(29) Var(m)j = W + Var(m)j ~ Var(m)[ 
M AE AE 
Ibis result implies that institutional structures where the 
administration has the right to appoint its officials to the central bank may 
raise policy uncertainty. However, uncertainty does not necessarily raise with 
such structures. As shown above, the condition far additional policy 
uncertainty to em:~rge is that the number of administration officials on the 
" 
board are higher than the number of regular vacancies occuiing every perlad. 
In this context (s>O), the numher of new appointees each perlad (s + r/n) 
is higher than the number of governors wi thin an incumbent block (r/n). As a 
consequence, the likelihood of finding incumbency structures with monetary 
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uncertainty may be higher because the new block of appointees {governors plus 
officials) is more pivota!. The additional uncertainty under the proposed 
structure is summarized by W. The higher s and n, and the lower r, the higher 
the value of W. Iherefore, the membership of ad.ministration officials on the 
central bank board generates more additional policy uncertainty the higher the 
number of officials and the number of periods in governors' terms, and the 
lower the number of governors on the board. 
4.4. Preelectoral versus postelectoral appointments 
Diverse institutional structures may provide different timings of 
appointment to the central bank. In particular, we may find central bank term 
structures such that sorne or all governors' terms run concurrently with the 
administration's. On the other hand, there may exiSt patterns of appointments 
such that the terms of governors and the terms of administrations are 
staggered. 
In arder to consider the different monetary uncertainty consequences 
arising from these diverse patterns of governors' appointments, let now assume 
a setting where elections are held every two periods. Suppose that elections 
are held at the beginning of periods t and t+2. Therefore, the time horizon 
between these two elections consists of periods t and t+l. Assume, as befare, 
that expectations over the future monetary stance are formed at the beginning 
of every period. Hence, at the start oí perlad there will be electoral 
uncertainty but such uncertainty has disappeared at the beginning of period 
t+l. 
Assuming that vacancies on the board arise every perlad, the time horizon 
between elections contains two moments of time far which vacancies occur. 
Depending on the particular term structures we consider, these moments can be 
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the following: 
-on the one hand, at the beginning oí periods t and t+l if governors' 
terms are coincident with the administration's. 
-on the other hand, at the end- of periods t and t+l, if governors' terms 
are not concurrent with the administration's. 
Since the beginning of perlod t+l coincides with the end of period t, the 
difference between our two settings is that in the former one appointments are 
made at the start of the administration' s term and in the latter one such 
appointments are made at the end of the administration's term. 
To consider the differences between our two alternative settings, we 
calculate the conditional varlances of the monetary instrument for periods t+l 
and t+2. 
Under both frameworks, monetary uncertainty for period t+l disappears 
because at the time monetary expectations are formed, the future board 
composition is known with certainty. 
However, monetary policy uncertainty differs for period t+2. Under the 
former setting, monetary expectations are formed befare the result for the t+2 
election is known, so that the future board composition is unknown. As a 
result, 
(30) Var(m) 1 
t+2, 
, 
Ji 
Under the 'ª lat1.er setting, monetary expectations are formed after knowing 
the t+2 board composition. Therefore, 
Var(m) 1 
t+2, BE 
(31) o 
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Expression (31) indicates that if admlnistrations appoint governors just 
befare elections, the expectations about the future stance of monetary policy 
are not subject to electoral uncertainty. Therefore, the variance of the 
rnonetary policy instrument is zero. Thus, we can conclude that governors' 
terms running concurrently with the administration' s term in office raise 
monetary policy uncertainty for periods after elections. 
~ AN EXAMPLE: PAST AND Efil'.§00 PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE FED 
To illustrate the results obtained in previous sections, this one 
derives, as an example, the likely effects on monetary policy uncertainty of 
alternative (past, present, and potential) structures of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
The present structure of the Board dates back to the 1935 Banking Act. It 
consists of seven members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate to 14-year terms. Governors' terms are staggered such that one term 
expires every even-numbered year. 
However, the original structure of the Board, given in the 1913 Federal 
Reserve Act, was not the same. That primitive structure consisted of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, and five 
presidential appointees serving ten-year terms with a two-year overlap. Such a 
structure emerged from the House and the Senate versions of the bill. The 
House version proposed that the Board consist of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Comptroller of the CUrrency, and 
four presidential appointees serving eight-year terms with a two-year overlap. 
The Senate version proposed that the Board consist of the Secretary of the 
Treasury and six presidential appointees serving six-year terms wi th a one-
year overlap. 
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The 1933 Banking Act increased the terms of Fed governors from ten years 
to twelve years and the 1935 Banking Act established the current structure by 
lengthening the terms to fourteen years and removing adm.lnistration officials 
from the Board. 
From the legislative history of the Board of Governors, it seems there 
were severa! institutional issues that legislators were more concerned on. In 
particular, i t is likely that the number of seats on the board was not 
regarded as an important issue because the number of governors plus the number 
of administration officials was the same (seven) under different bilis. 
However, i t seems that the decomposi tion of the number of seats in to the 
number of governors and the number of administration officials was an 
important issue. At the same time, it seems that the lengthenlng of the Board 
terms was vlewed as very important. 
For more recent proposed legislation to restructure the Federal Reserve 
System, Akhtar and Howe (1991) surveys all bilis and resoiutions introduced in 
Congress for the period 1979-1990.· For instance, of the proposed legisiation, 
19 bills have sought to shorten the terms of the governors, 14 bills have 
proposed the membership of the Secretary of the Treasury and/or the Chairman 
of the CEA to the FOMC, and 26 bilis have been introduced to make the terms of 
sorne governors concurrent with the President's. 
Our model can be used to iilustrate the likeiy effects of such old and 
modern proposals on monetary policy uncertainty. In arder to do so for the 
¡ 
earlier proposals,~we will derive monetary policy uncertainty arising from the 
t: 
1913 and 1935 bills. Assume that a period is composed of two years and 
elections are held every two periods. By supposing that appointments to the 
board are posteiectoral and by using expression (25), we have the following 
monetary uncertainty expressions for the perlad after an election under 
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1 
1 
L 
different bilis and acts: 
Var(m) 1 
19135 
Var(m) 1 
1913H 
2 2 2 2P (1-P) (m1-m2J since C 
This is so since in this case al l the possible incumbency structures 
provoke monetary uncertainty (that is, the probability of observing incumbency 
structures causlng monetary uncertainty is 1). 
Var(m) 1 
1913A 
Var(m) 1 
1935A 
4 4 2 20P (1-P) Cm1-m2 ) since C 
As a result we have the following sequence of inequalities: 
Var(mJI > Var(mJI > Var{m)I > Var(m)I 
1913H 1913A 19135 1935A 
Figure 1 shows these relations between monetary uncertainties for all the 
possibie values of P under the assumption that (m1-m2J2 = 1. 
[1NSERT FIGURE 1 ] 
These- results seem to show that the 1913 Federal Reserve Act was a 
compromise between the House and the Senate bilis in terms of monetary 
uncertainty. At the same time, the lengthening of Fed governors' terms in 
office and the removal of administration officials from the Board established 
21 
by the 1935 Banking Act-may have tended to cause less monetary uncertainty3. 
Similarly, the model can be used to account for the likely effects of 
modern proposals on monetary uncertainty, In particular, from the resul ts 
obtained in previous sectlons, al! the sorthening of terms, the membership of 
administration officials on the FOMC, and the coterminous terms of sorne 
governors (Chairman and Vicechairman) with President' s would be likely to 
provoke more monetary'policy uncertainty. 
h CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses the effects of alternative central bank structures 
on monetary pollcy uncertalnty. 
If the central bank lmplements the monetary policy for an electoral 
bipartisan society, the number of governors does not have any influence on 
monetary policy uncertainty but lengthening the terms on the board will lead 
to less policy uncertainty. Moreover, concurrent terms for governors and 
administration raise monetary uncertainty. Finally, the membership of 
administration officials on the central bank board may increase uncertainty 
over the future monetary stance. 
3 The conclusions obtained from our examples, however, rest on the ceteris 
paribus clause. As it is well-known, at its inception the Federal Reserve 
System was committed by the gold standard and in the l920s the political 
system still accepted the gold standard as a norm. This type of commitment was 
lost in the 1930s with the end of the lnternational gold standard (Hetzel, 
1990). At the same time, the New Deal banklng reforms of 1933-35 centrallzed 
System authority ~d power in the Board of Governors and reduced the authority 
of the regional R~serve Banks (Sylla, 1988). As a result, there were elements 
other than the pu~e Board of Governors structure that affected monetary policy 
and, accordingly, ·'monetary uncertainty. · 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix shows that central bank governors do not have any strategic 
incentive to misrepresent their own preferences. 
Suppose, for instance, a central bank board consisting of r 1 party 
governors and r 2 party 2 governors. Assume the following inequalities hold: 
(A.1) 
(A.2) 
Given the majority-rule voting process assumed, the monetary policy 
actually implemented will be m1. This policy course is "optima!" for party 1 
governors but it is not so for party 2 governors. 
Assume that sorne or all party 2 governors misrepresent their true 
preferences by declaring a new preference m2• = Am2, where A > l. Accordingly, 
the monetary stance chosen by the majority rule will also be m1 because such a 
policy is the preferred one by the median governor on the board. 
Moreover, since -under the assumed board composition- the monetary policy 
actually implemented will be the preferred one by party 1 governors, these 
governors have no incentive to misrepresent their true preferences. 
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